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ARGUMENT
I.

THE JUDGMENT AGAINST BUTTONWILLOW COMPACTION
MATERIALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED AGAINST
SYNDICATE
Although Syndicate goes to great lengths to distance itself from

Buttonwillow Compaction Materials ("BCM") and the default judgment entered
against BCM, Syndicate's efforts require not only reading out material provisions
of Syndicate's agreement with BCM but also the resort to inapplicable authority
and to doctrines that have not been accepted in either California or Utah.
A,

THROUGH ITS CONTRACT WITH BCM, SYNDICATE
ASSUMED BCM'S ROLE, LIABILITY, AND JUDGMENT

Syndicate has attempted to distance itself from the duties that it assumed
under the provisions of its agreement with BCM and to describe itself, and its
duties, in the simplest and least burdensome terms. However, the plain language
of the agreement strongly contradicts Syndicate's position, and advocates, almost
without question, for the adoption of the position Crusher has put forward.
Under Utah, and California, law, contracts must be enforced according to
their plain language, see Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc.,
2004 UT 54, % 10, 94 P.3d 292; Schaffter v. Creative Cap. Leasing Group, LLC,
166 Cal. App. 4th 745, 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) ('"We infer the parties' intent
from the written provisions of the contract [which are] "to be understood in their
ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning.'""),
and under the plain language of the Assignment of Cause of Action (the
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"Contract"), Syndicate became not only BCM's indemnitor, but also its surety,
insurer, and, in effect, guarantor.
Only two provisions of the Contract are material to the instant appeal.
First: The Assignment of the Claims provision. (R. 1134.) Under this provision,
BCM agreed to assign to Syndicate all of its rights, interests, and title to any
claims that BCM might otherwise have had against Crusher. (Id.) In turn,
Syndicate assumed full responsibility for all of BCM's responsibilities pursuant to
the dispute with Crusher Syndicate as if Crusher actually were BCM. Second:
The Indemnification provision. (Id.) Under this provision, Syndicate agreed not
only to generally indemnify BCM from any of Crusher's possible claims against
it, but also to hold BCM harmless, to defend BCM from these claims, and to
assume total responsibility for all costs or losses that BCM might suffer or incur as
a result of any litigation between BCM and Crusher. (R. 1134.) Assuming, as this
court must, that the parties intended to give life to all of the provisions of the
Contract, and that the parties intended all of the provisions of the Contract to have
meaning, Syndicate's assertion that the Contract is a mere indemnification
agreement is untenable. Syndicate agreed to far more that simple indemnity in
both the first and second material provisions of the Contract, and although one
could read each of these provisions as implying indemnification, such a reading
would require reading out of the contract several provisions that the parties clearly
intended to adopt, and such an interpretation would be contrary to accepted
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authority on this issue. See Fairbourn Commercial 2004 UT 54, ^f 10 (noting that
all provisions of a contract are to be given effect, and none are to be ignored).
Applying this authority to the provisions of the Contract, the inevitable
conclusion is that Syndicate bargained to become far more than a simple
indemnitor. Rather, Syndicate bargained to assume BCM's position in every way
concerning the dispute with Crusher. As asserted by Syndicate itself, Syndicate
bargained become the indemnitor. But it also agreed to guarantee that no harm
would come to BCM, and it agreed to assume the role of defender and insurer of
BCM, eliminating the need for BCM to respond to any complaint filed by Crusher,
and eliminating the need for BCM to retain legal services, or to incur any costs
related to a potential legal action. In fact, pursuant to the Contract, Syndicate
agreed not only to indemnify and defend BCM against any possible legal action or
harm, it insured BCM that no harm would come to it, and it guaranteed that any
costs incurred, and any responsibility imposed, would be bome solely by
Syndicate. Consequently, contrary to the oversimplified interpretation urged by
Syndicate, under the terms of the Contract, Syndicate assumed all of the rights,
responsibilities, and duties that otherwise would have inured to BCM in this
matter, and in doing so, Syndicate not only assumed the role of indemnitor, surety,
insurer, and guarantor for BCM, but it in effect assumed BCM's position in the
dispute and accepted responsibility for the judgment rendered by the trial court.

3
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B.

SYNDICATE'S ARGUMENT RELIES ON INAPPLICABLE
AUTHORITY

The applicable authority cited by Crusher is contrary to the trial court's
refusal to apply the BCM judgment against Syndicate and supports Crusher's
position on this issue. Moreover, contrary to the assertions of Syndicate, this
authority advocates for the reversal of the trial court's refusal to apply the
judgment against Syndicate in this matter.
First, in attempting to evade the responsibility that it agreed to assume,
Syndicate asserts that Crusher's position is barred by the Common or Joint
Defense Doctrine. See, e.g. Sutter v. Payne, 989 S.E.2d 887 (Ark. 1999);
Southerland v. Gross, 772 p.2d 1287 (Nev. 1989). However, Syndicate's brief
constitutes the first and only mention of this doctrine in this matter, precluding its
use as support for the trial court's decision. See generally Bailey v. Bayles, 2002
UT 58, 52 P.3d 1158 (limiting the application of the affirm on any grounds
doctrine). Further, a review of both Utah and California authorities reveals that
neither jurisdiction ahs adopted the doctrine, although logic would dictate that the
opportunity has been presented in both jurisdictions. Additionally, to the extent
that the joint defense doctrine has acquired any standing within either California or
Utah, it is simply inapplicable to the instant case.
Under the common defense doctrine, the defense set forth by one defendant
may be extended to & joint defendant '"where the defense interposed by [the]
answering defendant is not personal to himself,.. .but common to all.'" Ex rel
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Everett, 544 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Ore. 1976) (citation omitted). Here, Crusher's
effort to extend liability to Syndicate and its principal was, as recognized by the
trial court, an overextension. Simply put, Crusher had never entered into any
relationship with Syndicate or its principal, and its efforts to extend liability to
them were therefore unsuccessful. In contrast, Crusher's sole relationship was
with BCM, and only BCM and Crusher had discussed and contracted for crushing
equipment. As a result, the defenses interposed by Syndicate and its principal
were personal to them, and not common to both themselves and BCM.
Consequently, Syndicate's resort to the joint defense doctrine should be soundly
rejected.
Similarly, Syndicate's efforts to rely upon foreign authority to reduce the
scope of responsibility that it assumed as BCM's surety are also inapplicable. In
this effort, Syndicate cites the court to several cases, including National Technical
Systems v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 97 Cal. App. 4th 415 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) and All Bay Mill & Lumber Co., Inc. v. Surety Co. of the Pacific, 208 Cal.
App. 3d 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). However, contrary to Syndicate's assertion, this
authority does not support Syndicate. For instance, in All Bay, the court was
asked to interpret the scope of a sureties' responsibility pursuant to a statute that
defines the responsibilities of a surety to a contractor. See 97 Cal. App. 4th at 15.
In response, the All Bay court held that the sureties' responsibility were limited to
the terms articulated within the plain language of the statute being analyzed. See
id. In contrast, here, Syndicate's responsibility were assumed pursuant not to
5
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statutory authority, nor are they controlled by any applicable statute, rather,
Syndicate's responsibilities arise from the Contract, rendering All Bay easily
distinguishable.
In National Technical, the court reviewed whether a surety was bound by a
judgment entered against the principle in an action in which the surety did not
participate and had no opportunity to participate. See 97 Cal. App. 4th at 417.
The court found, relying on All Bay, that under the circumstances the default
judgment was not applicable against the surety. Id, at 422. However, the court
then carefully noted that its reasoning was predicated upon the absence of notice:
Stating that where notice is provided "the surety may move to intervene in the
action, or it may simply elect to await the final judgment in the action and the
[principal's] enforcement of the liability on the bond," actions not available to the
surety in the absence of notice. Id As applied to the instant case, two elements
distinguish National Technical from the instant case. First, here, unlike in
National Technical, no bond was asked for or issued; rather, Syndicate assumed
BCM's role and responsibilities as a result of its decision to enter into the
Contract. Second, and to Crusher's clear advantage, unlike the surety in National
Technical, Syndicate had notice of the action that Crusher filed against BCM and
chose to sit idly by. Syndicate allowed default to issue and allowed the default
judgment to be entered, but only after having been fully apprised of Crusher's
efforts against BCM. Thus, to the extent that National Technical is material to this
case, it supports Crusher's argument.
6
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Finally, Syndicate asserts that its success at trial precludes it being bound
by the BCM default judgment. However, the authority cited by Syndicate is
unpersuasive, not only because of the language found in more persuasive
authority, but also because the doctrine supported by these authorities is predicated
upon the inapplicable common defense doctrine. The best example of Syndicate's
error in relying on this line of cases is found in Frow v. De La Vaga, 82 U.S. 552
(1872).
In Frow, an extremely brief opinion—one-half page in length—the
Supreme Court held, pursuant to rules of equity, that it would have been improper
for the trial court to enter default judgment against one or more of several
defendants, when the claim against the defendants were identical, or apparently
identical. IdLat554. However, the Court did not explain the grounds for its
holding, and did not articulate the facts that supported its conclusion. See id.
Moreover, at least one Federal Court of Appeal has evaluated Frow in the
intervening years and concluded that Frow was issued prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that with the adoption of Rule 54 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Frow likely was robbed of any remaining legal
force, rendering any reliance upon Frow after the adoption of the federal rules
unreasonable. See Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 535 F.2d 742, 746 n.4 (2nd Cir.
1976). Frow is emblematic of the cases that Syndicate has cited, and as a result,
this Court should reject the cases as unpersuasive and not well-grounded.
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In contrast, the analysis of Drill South, Inc. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 234 F.3d
1232 (11th Cir. 2000), provides perhaps the best insight into this issue. In Drill
South, when presented with the question of whether a surety was bound by the
default judgment entered against its principle, the Eleventh Circuit first
determined that "the general rule that has emerged [on this issue is that a surety is
bound by any judgment against its principal, default or otherwise, when the surety
had full knowledge of the action against the principal and an opportunity to
defend." Drill South, 234 F.3d at 1235.l "The law requires only that a surety have
notice of and an opportunity to defend before it is bound by a judgment against its
principal." Id As Crusher articulated in its opening brief, it is undisputed that
Syndicate had notice of Crusher's claims against BCM, and not only an
opportunity to defend BCM, but also an obligation to do so. (R. 1134). However,
rather than carrying out the duty that it had assumed under the Contract, Syndicate
merely ignored Crusher's claims against BCM, failing to file an answer, allowing
default to be entered, and allowing a default judgment to issue, all without protest
of any kind on any level by Syndicate. Under these circumstances, Syndicate
simply has waived its opportunity to assert any defenses regarding Crusher's

1

Syndicate points out that the Drill South court acknowledged that "[substantial dispute exist in the law as
to whether a default judgment rendered against a principal is binding upon the principal's surety," but
Syndicate then fails to note that the dispute is, in essence, hollow, and that the better reasoned authority
hold to the general rule that Crusher has asserted throughout these proceedings. Drill South, Inc. v. Int'l
Fid. Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 2000). Syndicate also fails to acknowledge that the court in
Drill South applied the "general rule" to circumstances largely identical, procedurally, to the instant case,
which led that court to hold that a surety with notice and an opportunity to defend its principal was bound
by any judgment rendered against the principal. Id. More precisely, the court held that because the surety
"had full knowledge of the potential for default judgment... possessed numerous opportunities to defend
the ultimate judgment" and had ample opportunity to defend the case against he principal on the merits.
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claims against BCM, and as BCM indemnitor, surety, insurer, and guarantor,
Syndicate is now required to assume full responsibility for the judgment against
BCM.
Accordingly, this Court should conclude that the trial court erred in
refusing to apply the BCM judgment against Syndicate and reverse the trial court's
decision on that issue.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISQUALIFY
SYNDICATE'S TRIAL COUNSEL
It is undisputed that attorney Scott Lilja ("Lilja"), who is a shareholder

within the firm that acted a Syndicate's trial counsel, represented Crusher during
the first ten (10) years of Crusher's existence, and that his representation extended
not only to the crafting of business documents, but also to representing Crusher in
litigation matters during that period. It is further undisputed that Lilja represented
Crusher's principal in personal litigation matters, and that Lilja was intimately
aware of the nature of Crusher's business practices, and the business and litigation
tactics and strategy employed by its principal However, Syndicate argues that
because Lilja played no direct role in Crusher's relationship with BCM, and
because Lilja had actually ceased representing Crusher prior to BCM approaching
Crusher in 2004, under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, the trial court
properly rejected Crusher's motion to disqualify Lilja and his firm as trial counsel.
In asserting this position, Syndicate appears to misunderstand the thrust of
Crusher's argument.

9
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In short, Crusher consistently has maintained, both to the trial court and on
appeal, that the nature and extent of Lilja's representation of Crusher was more
than sufficient to disqualify him, and by association his firm, from acting as
Syndicate's trial counsel. Substantial authority supports Crusher's position,
although Crusher concedes that no Utah court has yet addressed this exact issue.
The most comprehensive discussion of the authority applicable to this issue is
found in Charles W. Wolfram article, Former-Client Conflicts. Charles W.
Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 677, 680 (1997).
Wolfram's discussion distills the disqualification standard into one easily applied
element: Maintaining client confidentiality. Id, at 687; see also Poly Software
International Inc. v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1490 (D. Utah 1995) (stating
"ethical rules are generally concerned with the behavior and regulation of the legal
profession, and more specifically here with the protection of communications that
a reasonable person would assume to be confidential"). Confidentiality is at risk
any time that '"representation of the present client will involve the use of
information acquired in the course of representing the former client.'" Wolfram,
at 685 (quoting Restatement (second) of Conflicts § 213). And Crusher argues
that "[o]nce a substantial relationship has been found, a presumption arises that a
client has indeed revealed facts to the attorney that require his disqualification."
Smith v. Whatcott 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985); see also id.
(highlighting the panoply of jurisdictions that have adopted the presumptive
conflict rule). Crusher further argues that Utah should join the large majority of
10
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jurisdictions that have adopted the presumptive rule, because such a rule "is
intended to protect client confidentiality as well as to avoid any appearance of
impropriety, [and] '[it] is intended to prevent proof that would be improper to
make."' Id (quoting In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d
1341, 1347 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Syndicate, rather than addressing Crusher's actual argument, attempts to
deflect attention from the argument, arguing that Crusher's position is not
supported under Utah law. However, Syndicate's crabbed reading of applicable
Utah authority fails to acknowledge that Utah courts have recognized the
importance of client confidentiality and of avoiding the appearance of impropriety
that could embarrass both the courts and the Bar. For instance, in Marguilies v.
Upchurch, the Utah Supreme Court noted that relatively few opinions related to
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct have been issued, but stated that "A
lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. The basis of
this tenet is that society's perception of the integrity of our legal system may be as
important as the reality, since it is the perception that engenders public confidence
that justice will be dispensed." 696 P.2d 1195, 1204 (Utah 1985) (quotations and
citation omitted). Thus, after reviewing the circumstances of the matter before it,
the Marguilies Court determined that the protection of the "integrity of the court
system as well as the integrity of the [legal] profession" required the
disqualification of trial counsel, even though counsel had not directly represented
the defendants who sought the disqualification. Id at 1205. Further, although not
11
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the product of a Utah Court, the holding of City of El Paso v. Soule may prove
most persuasive in this matter. See 6 F. Supp. 2d 616, 624 (W.D. Tex. 1998). In
addressing the defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs counsel, the Soule court
found that plaintiffs counsel had performed business related services for the
defendant, and that "[i]t would be patently unfair to allow the same lawyer to
represent interests adverse to a former client regarding the same business affairs,
especially in light of the theories for recovery in, and the nature of, the underlying
suit." Id at 624. Thus, the court granted the motion to disqualify to avoid the
potential unfairness and to protect the integrity of the legal system.
Applying this reasoning to the instant case, it appears that the trial court
erred in refusing to disqualify Syndicate's trial counsel. First, it is undisputed that
Lilja operated as both business and litigation counsel for Crusher and its principal
for almost ten years. (R. 1313 Tr. 23:2-11, 16:18-20.) During that time, Lilja
advised Crusher and its principal in business matters necessary to the foundation
of the business and to grow the business. (R. 1313 Tr. 19:13-18.) Through this
representation, Lilja had access to all of Crusher's business information, its
contract formation documents and principal, as well as to the strategic and tactical
basis for the decisions that were made by Crusher's officers and principals in
operating Crusher. (R. 1313 Tr. 10:1-21, 11:7-21, 12, 24-27.) In essence, Lilja
possessed the Crusher "playbook," which provided him, and by association,
anyone associated with him, valuable insight into Crusher's operations, activities,
and decision making processes. And more importantly to the instant case, Lilja
12
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was central in Crusher's structuring of rental agreements to prevent lessees from
tying-up or claiming ownership interests in leased equipment. (R. 1313 Tr. 25:914.) As a result, the information available to Lilja through his years of
representing Crusher should be presumed to be substantially related to any dispute
involving Crusher's leases, rental agreements, or other contracts issued in the
course of Crusher's business operations.
In turn, Lilja's possession of the Crusher playbook, by necessity, suggests
that Lilja's involvement in any lawsuit against Crusher carries with it the
appearance of impropriety that the Utah Rules of Professional Responsibility seek
to avoid. See Marguilies, 696 P.2d at 1205. Lilja is presumed, or should be
presumed, to possess confidential information obtained during his representation
of Crusher, and he is charged with safekeeping this information. The length and
nature of the relationship between Crusher and Lilja gives rise to this presumption,
and the trial court erred in permitting any investigation into the nature of this
information. Further, the trial court erred in failing to recognize that because of
Lilja's presumed possession of potentially damaging confidential information,
Lilja owes a duty to Crusher, and that pursuant to that duty, Lilja and his law firm
should have been disqualified as Syndicate's trial counsel. The trial court's error,
by definition, tainted the entire trial process. Therefore, Crusher now requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify and remand
this matter back to the trial court for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all of the aforementioned reasons, this Court should
reverse the trial court's judgment and grant judgment for Crusher, or in that
alternative, remand this matter for a new trial with instructions that Syndicate is to
obtain new counsel.
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